theorists have tended to take it for granted. Drawing on work from a decade-long theoretical research program, I argue that reciprocity is structured and variable across different forms of exchange, that these variations in the structure of reciprocity have profound effects on the emergence of integrative bonds of trust and solidarity, and that these effects are explained and mediated by a set of risk-and conflict-based processes. I discuss the consequences of this work for organizational theories of embeddedness and the production of social capital through network ties. Finally, I ask how the structure of networks and the structure of reciprocity are related to one another, and explore possible implications of the structure of reciprocity for exchange theorists' assumptions about actor motivations.
Keywords: social exchange, reciprocity, solidarity, networks
Reciprocity, the giving of benefits to another in return for benefits received, is one of the defining features of social exchange and, more broadly, of social life. Many sociologists have recognized its impor tance over the years. In the early 1900s, Hobhouse (1906:12) called reciprocity "the vital principle of society " and Simmel (1950:387) noted that social equilibrium and cohesion could not exist without "the reci procity of service and return service." In the mid-1900s, both Becker and Gouldner called attention to the seemingly universal character of reciprocity. Becker (1956:1) referred to our species as "homo reciprocus," while Gould ner (1960) suggested that a "norm of reci procity" helps assure that people help others who have helped them in the past. More recently, evolutionary biologists and experi mental economists have proposed that we are hard-wired for reciprocity, and have described reciprocity as the evolutionary basis for cooperation in society (Nowak and Sigmund 2000) .
Exchange theorists, on the other hand, have tended to take reciprocity for granted, partly because it is part of the definition of exchange. Emerson (1972b) , for example, noted that since reciprocity is not a variable attribute of exchange relations, it is of little theoretical interest. Reciprocity has also been overlooked because sociological exchange theorists have for decades concentrated on forms of exchange that involve only a single type of reciprocity:
two-party direct exchanges in which bilateral agreements are jointly negotiated. Emerson (1972a, b) had in mind when he developed his theory of power dependence relations. About 15 years ago, I became interested in how these different forms of exchange that my colleagues and I were studying?negotiated exchange versus reciprocal exchange?might be affecting our theories and our experimental findings. I wrote an initial paper on this topic back in the early 1990s (Molm 1994) , and in the late 1990s I began a new program of research comparing different forms of exchange. One product of that work is an exten sive set of findings about the effects of different forms of exchange on both behavior and affec tive bonds. A second product is a theory of rec iprocity that explains why different forms of exchange have such different effects on the development of trust and affective bonds. A third product?an ongoing one?is an effort to link this theoretical and experimental work to organizational and network theories of embedd edness and social capital. And a fourth product is some very preliminary thoughts on the imp lications of reciprocity for the motivational assumptions that underlie our theories of exchange. This latter product also owes a debt to my earlier work on coercive power and risk aversion (Molm 1997) .
In this address I draw on this work, now in its final phases, to make three central points about reciprocity and its effects, and to dis cuss the implications of this work for theories of social capital, organizations, networks, and social exchange.
I begin by developing these three points: (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007) . Generalized exchange adds a second dimension to the structure of reci procity, whether reciprocity is direct or indi rect ( Figure lc) . In generalized exchange, one actor gives benefits to another, and receives benefits from another, but not from the same actor. Benefits flow unilaterally, as in reciprocal exchange, but reciprocity is indi rect. A's giving to B is not reciprocated directly, by B's giving to A (as in reciprocal and negotiated exchange), but rather by a third party in the social circle, whom we can call C. A, B, and C might compose a chain-general ized system of exchange (as shown in Figure   lc ), or they might be part of a larger, more diffuse network, with no defined structure?
what Takahashi (processes of attraction and cohesion). The study of power and inequality that dominated exchange work during the 1980s and into the 1990s was about differentiation; the study of trust, commitment, and affective bonds is about integration. Our return to these topics also coincided with the growing interest of orga nizational, political, and social network the orists in the development of social capital 2 I define trust as the belief that the exchange partner can be relied upon to help, rather than to exploit, the actor. Lawler and Yoon's work on relational cohesion theory (Lawler and Yoon 1993 , 1996 , 1998 , and Lawler's (2001) affect theory of exchange.
and the well-being of communities (Paxton 2002; Portes 1998; Putnam 1993) . Over the years, as the research program developed and a theory of reciprocity began to take shape, my colleagues and I studied a variety of integrative bonds, reflecting ties to both the exchange partner and the relation ship. Here is a brief summary of what we found in many experiments over the years:
First, actors engaged in reciprocal exchange trust their partners more, express more affec tive regard for them, and feel more committed to them than actors engaged in negotiated exchange (Molm, Takahashi, and Peterson 2000) . They also perceive their relationships as more united and harmonious?as relations between partners rather than adversaries (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007) . Second, behaviors that signal the exchange partner's trustworthiness?such as their behav ioral commitment to the actor?have stronger effects on trust and affect when exchanges are reciprocal rather than negotiated (Molm et al. 2000) . Actors who negotiate agreements are just as likely to form behavioral commit ments, but these commitments are less likely to translate into affective bonds.
Third, despite the seemingly greater proce dural fairness of negotiated exchange (the joint decision-making, greater "voice," advance knowledge of terms), actors perceive their partner's treatment of them as fairer when exchanges are reciprocal, both for ex changes that are objectively equal and ones that are objectively unequal (Molm, Takaha shi, and Peterson 2003) . Actors are also more willing to participate in unequal ex changes that disadvantage them when ex changes are reciprocal rather than negotiated (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2006) . Fourth, generalized exchange produces stronger integrative bonds, on all of these di mensions (greater trust, affective regard, and solidarity), than either form of direct exchange (Molm et al. 2007 ). All of these effects are independent of key dimensions of behavior: Actors who engage in exchanges with the same fre quency and the same equality (or inequality) feel differently about their partners and 
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So, what is it about that experience that produces these strong and consistent effects?
The reciprocity theory of exchange that we developed and tested in the second phase of the project links the structure of reciprocity to integrative bonds through its effects on a set of risk-and conflict-based mechanisms (Molm et al. 2007) , as shown in Figure 3 . First, the unilateral flow of benefits in reciprocal and generalized exchange makes exchange risky and uncertain. When actors
give to another with no assurance of reciproc ity, they risk potential loss?giving to another while receiving little or nothing in return.
And when reciprocity is indirect, rather than direct, risk is even greater; actors are depen dent on the actions of multiple others in a col lective system rather than on a single other. Risk increases integrative bonds by promot ing trust; as many scholars have recognized, risk is a necessary condition for proving one's own trustworthiness, and for judging another's (Kelley and Thibaut 1978; Kollock 1994; Molm et al. 2000; Yamagishi and Ya magishi 1994) . In addition to building trust, acts of reciproc ity that are voluntary and uncertain?rather than a taken-for-granted part of a bilateral agreement ?convey expressive value, over and above the instrumental benefits of exchange (Molm et al. 2007 ). In direct exchange, such acts communicate regard for the partner and a desire to continue the relationship (Kollock and O'Brien 1992; Kranton 1996; Offer 1997 ). Acts of indirect reciprocity convey even greater expressive value, because they benefit another to whom the giver owes no direct debt and at the same time contribute to maintaining a co llective enterprise that benefits the network as a whole.
The structure of reciprocity also affects integrative bonds by making either the competitive or the cooperative aspects of mixed-motive exchanges more salient to the actors (Molm et al. 2006 Our research supported the independent effects of all three of these causal mecha nisms, and also produced new findings sug gesting that no single mechanism could account for all of the differences between the forms of exchange:
First, increasing the riskiness of negotiated exchanges, by making agreements nonbind ing, should increase trust, and it does (Molm, Schaefer, and Collett 2009) . But the trust produced is less resilient?less forgiving of the partner's occasional digressions from trustworthiness?and less affect-based than the trust between reciprocal exchange part ners. In reciprocal exchanges, trust and affec tive regard for the partner go hand-in-hand; in negotiated exchanges, trust is not tied to affective bonds, and it is quickly destroyed when the other's trustworthiness is less than ideal.
Second, we can reduce the differences between reciprocal and negotiated exchange by making conflict more salient in reciprocal exchange (Molm et al. 2006) . But the gap between the two forms of exchange in feel ings and perceptions never closes completely, and actors remain far more willing to partici pate in unequal reciprocal exchanges that dis advantage them than in unequal negotiated exchanges.
Third, under some conditions actors allo cate their reciprocal giving, and their feelings of trust and affective regard, to different part ners, exchanging most often with the partner whose resources are more valuable, but form ing stronger integrative bonds with the partner whose reciprocity is more constant (Molm et al. 2007 ). These bonds of trust and solidarity contribute to building reserves of social capital that may influence behavioral choices in the future; for example, when choosing a partner for a new and risky endeavor. Lawler and Yoon's (1996, 1998) 
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RELATIONS 8 TW N TH STRUCTUR6 Of RECIPROCITY RND TH STRUCTURE Of NETWORKS
The role of both networks and reciprocity in the production of social capital raises a more general question of how the structure of net works connecting actors, and the structure of reciprocity connecting their behaviors and benefits, are related to one another. Let me briefly describe three aspects of their relationship. First, each structure has independent ef fects on integrative bonds, net of the other.
Integrative bonds are stronger in forms of exchange with unilateral flows of benefit and indirect reciprocity (Molm et al. 2000 (Molm et al. , 2007 , and they are stronger in networks with high mutual dependence and equal power (Lawler and Yoon 1998) .
Second, the two structures interact with each other in their effects on integrative bonds.
Effects of the structure of reciprocity are greater in networks of unequal power and greater for power-disadvantaged actors than for power-advantaged actors. Power differen ces accentuate the risk-and conflict-based mechanisms that underlie effects of the struc ture of reciprocity (Molm et al. 2007 ). They increase the risk and uncertainty of reciprocal exchange, particularly for disadvantaged ac tors, and they increase the salience of conflict in negotiated exchange?again, particularly for disadvantaged actors. An important conse quence of these effects is that reciprocal exchange reduces the differences in how actors in an unequal power relation perceive each other.
Third, exchange networks structure inter action in ways that either encourage repeated exchanges between the same actors or reduce the likelihood of such behavioral commit ments, and those commitments are important for the development of integrative bonds? especially in forms of exchange with unilat eral giving (Molm et al. 2000) . In generalized exchange, networks that create structured pat terns of giving, such as chain-generalized exchange, encourage repeated acts of unilat eral giving from a particular benefactor to a particular recipient. In direct exchange, net works that create differences in power? differences in actors' relative dependencies on particular partners?affect the formation of behavioral commitments (Cook and Emer son 1978). More dependent, less powerful ac tors will seek committed relations with their more advantaged partners, to reduce uncer tainty, and whether their advantaged partners reciprocate that commitment has strong ef fects on their feelings for them. But when exchange networks are balanced on power, offering all actors alternative partners who are equally dependent on them and who offer equivalent resources of equal value, actors will be structurally indifferent as to whom they exchange with, and they will be less likely to develop regular patterns of reciproc ity with any particular partner. Commitment could come from other sources?from com mon social identities, for example (Tajfel and Turner 1986)?but it will not come from the network structure.
These connections between the structure of power in exchange networks, and the struc ture of reciprocity in different forms of exchange, suggest an important link between Blau's (1964) processes of differentiation and integration. Although power inequality reduces integration, its negative effects can be countered by forms of exchange with uni lateral giving. Reciprocal exchange enables actors to overcome the divisions created by power and to develop the trust and affective bonds that promote productive exchange rela tions. As a result, power and trust need not be mutually exclusive, as some have suggested (e.g., Granovetter 2002).
IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT ACTORS' MOTIVATIONS
Finally, the structure of reciprocity may affect our theories of exchange in a more fundamental way, through its implications becomes more important. Consequently, we should expect that minimizing losses would be more important in reciprocal than in nego tiated exchange, and most important in gener alized exchange. And, indeed, opportunity costs have the strongest suppressive effect on generalized exchange, because they increase risk in these already highly risky structures (Molm et al. 2007 ).
5 The option of accepting some short-term costs in re turn for long-term gain assumes a continuing relation of recurring exchanges between the same actors. This is an assumption, more generally, of the social exchange framework and power-dependence theory (Emerson 1972b; Molm 2006) , and it characterizes the study of both reciprocal and negotiated exchange in this research pro gram. At the same time, it is worth noting that while recip rocal exchange requires repeated interaction between actors, negotiated exchange does not?negotiated trans actions can be either one-shot or recurring, and either independent or serially dependent. For a more extended discussion of these differences, see Molm (1994 
CONCLUSION
Reciprocity is both a defining feature of social exchange and a source of societal cooperation and solidarity. Here, I have briefly described a program of research and a theory of reciprocity that offers a more nuanced conception of reciprocity as a vari able characteristic of exchange whose effects on solidarity and trust depend on its structure. 
